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ABSTRACT: Why is there so much distortion in ordinary, political, social, and ethical argument? Since we 
have a pervasive interest in reasoning well and corresponding abilities, the extent of distortion invites 
explanation. The leading candidates are the need to economize, widespread, fallacious heuristics or 
assumptions, and self-defensive biases. I argue that these are not sufficient. An additional force is the 
intellectual pressure generated by acceptance of norms of conversation and argument, which exclude 
‘middles’ of,  prominently,  neither accept (believe) nor reject (disbelieve). I conjecture that the distortion 
we find is due to intellectual and normative pressures generated by our commitment to these excluded-
middle norms and if, or when, their force is lessened, there is likely to be less distortion. 
 
 





Distortion in the expression or understanding of others’ arguments I take to be sustained 
underestimation by misrepresentation, not merely a one-shot lapse. Even when we  
observe only brief instances of distortion, a vivid and typical enough instance can supply 
good evidence of a pattern of misrepresentation. Since I concentrate on sincere distortion, 
where the distorter is taken in, it will not be intended. Still, distortion involves intellectual 
negligence or irresponsibility, primarily by the biased selection of sources, where one has 
available alternatives. 
 The means of distortion individually or in combination are familiar: simple 
dismissal, without real evaluation, emphasis, as in my example, on weaknesses in 
inessential or minor premises (see Republic 338d), fallacies ‘ad’, genetic fallacies, and 
disparagement by innuendo, sarcasm, ridicule,  etc, and related strawman fallacies. There 
is also simplifications that put the argument in a poorer light than is obviously available, 
even when some simplification is necessary due to space limitations or to render the 
content accessible and engaging for a broad audience. 
 We should be puzzled by the extent of distortion. We value good reasoning and 
argument. We must be competent in their use, otherwise our rudimentary reasoning 
would not work so well. These are primary sources for the acquisition of new information 
and the modifications of our beliefs, whose truth we depend on for successful actions. 
 
∗ A revised version of this paper is to be presented at the Episteme conference in Rutgers June 29-30 2007 
and subsequently published in that journal. 
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How do we explain then the generation, large degree of toleration, and even the 
acceptance, of so much distorted argument? 
 Though we should be puzzled or surprised by the extent of distortion—so that we 
should take it to call for explanation—I doubt that anyone is puzzled or surprised. First, it 
is difficult to be surprised with what you expect, almost a commonplace. Second, we are 
familiar with a variety of very plausible explanations for the extent and persistence of 
distortion.  Motivational sources, as well as psychological means, of distortion include: 
self-defensive biases; belief conservatism; self-interested motivation to persuade; 
common fallacies, faulty assumptions and weaknesses in reasoning; limited possibilities 
for falsification (discovering that one is wrong); ‘groupthink’; and the need to economize. 
Although I think these explanations go far to explain the motivations and workings of 
distortion, and I draw upon them, there remains a missing ingredient. 
 The missing ingredient I hypothesize are norms to exclude ‘middles’ of no firm 
judgment. An excluded middle norm to govern argumentation would bar a hearer or 
interlocutor from neither acceptance nor rejection of an argument presented to him. The 
norm I call “refute-or-accept” holds that if a hearer or interlocutor cannot refute an 
argument presented to him, he represents himself as accepting it.1 (For reasons of space, 
I’ll largely ignore the important qualification ‘represents himself’). This norm excludes 
the middle of non-acceptance despite a failure to refute.  
 Most space in this paper is devoted to introducing the hypothesis----clarifying the 
nature of excluded-middle norms while taking normativity for granted; exhibiting and 
explaining their range of application. At the end, and then only briefly, I advance the 
hypothesis merely as worth pursuing, a pursuit which down the road requires much 
empirical testing. I know of no actual tests.2  
 The hypothesis naturally divides in two: The missing ingredient is actually 
involved in distortion; and  absent the missing ingredient, distortion would diminish. For 
purposes of this paper, I need claim only that we do, or think that we should, conform to 





In this section, I’ll offer some examples of excluded-middle norms (or excluded-middle 
circumstances). The domains where these norms or circumstances hold are ones  where, 
                                                 
1. I critically discuss, qualify, and defend this norm at length in “Resisting the force of argument” 
(unpublished). 
2. For such tests in the realm of choice with lots of citations to related empirical work: Dhar and Simonson 
(2003) Here’s an obvious proposal to apply to argument exchanges. Divide subjects randomly. Both groups 
will read extended argumentative passages, related to positions for which their own position is stated or 
known. One group is told that they must evaluate the arguments, as cogent or not. The other group is 
divided further: they are to evaluate the argument, and they can come to a judgment that is pro, con, or a 
weighted judgment (pretty good..); the other group is told they can pass on evaluating the argument. 
Subsequently each subject is asked (the material is surrendered) to summarize the argument.  
 One problem: the 3rd (and crucial) group, who can pass–they must be provided with some other 
task to keep the situations comparable. But what task will allow indifference to be indifference and yet not 
force them close to an excluded middle? 
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to speak figuratively, silence, is assent or taken as assent; omission, effectively 
commission. Next, I’ll offer clarification of role of excluded-middle norms to exclude 
‘middles’ that cannot be logically excluded. In the following section, I raise and try to 
allay some doubts about whether epistemic excluded-middle norms are rational to believe 
or to adopt. Finally, and briefly, I turn to the main task of developing the hypothesis that 
these norms play a role in distortion. 
 A closely related norm to refute-or-accept is implied by ‘how else’ explanatory 
challenges, whereby unless you can offer an alternative or better explanation for a 
surprising or puzzling phenomena than the challenger, you are taken to be duty bound to 
accept his.3 In his 12.2005 column in Scientific American, Michael Schermer 
(“Mr.Skeptic Goes to Esalen”) writes, “Once it become known that Mr. Skeptic was 
there, for example, I heard one after another ‘How do you explain this?” story, mostly 
involving angels, aliens, and the usual paranormal fare.” (p.38). The ‘how else’ move is 
an assumed premise in conspiracy theory presentations as well. As a challenge, though, it 
is susceptible to the Lockean objection noted below. 
 In the next section I discuss excluded-middle confusions or fallacies of 
withholding belief with disbelief. That confusion is facilitated by norms for belief that 
mandate that it take on an all-or-nothing form for many beliefs, even  about complex or 
controversial issues, rather than holding them to a certain degree.4 Grounds in support of 
our holding beliefs mainly in full or all-or-nothing form derives from introspection and 
considerations of economy. We cannot operate with, or hold on to, numerous beliefs as 
matters of degree. It would render enormously complex and burdensome the regular 
inference from beliefs (and desires) to action. 
 Evidence that we do, in fact, hold beliefs on opinionated, complex matters in this 
way comes from Deanna Kuhn’s (1991) research. She examines argumentation among 
ordinary citizens about three topics: “What causes prisoners to return to crime after 
they’re released?” “What causes children to fail in school?” and “What causes 
unemployment?” (1991, 16). Despite these questions eliciting a large range of possible 
causal explanations from subjects, many of which blatantly call for research, she 
observes:  
 
All but a few participants quite readily offer their views on the topics they are asked about and 
exhibit little difficulty in expressing themselves.(1991, 21-22; for qualifications on her findings, 
see Brem and Rips 2000) 
 
 Various dialogue models impose excluded-middle norms with little or no 
comment, and they would not deserve comment were their models to be limited purely to 
dialogue games. A participant acquires a burden of proof, which, if not met, concedes the 
claims or arguments of another. (See, for example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984 
p.18. and  Rule 17 p. 174; and Rescher 1977 p.44.) Walton and Krabbe (1995) comment 
“unchallenged assertions count as conceded. We do not see any reason to admit a middle 
                                                 
3 Sober (2001) rejects related reasoning which he calls the  “Only game in town” fallacy 33-34 
4 Conversationally, except in unusual circumstances, it is not of informational value to introduce that you 
do not hold a belief, since this is true of a vast number of propositions. It is expected. A lack of belief 
becomes informative in denying an assertion that expresses someone's belief. See further Adler (2000). 
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position.” (p.137) Now Walton and Krabbe formulate this condition very weakly, and 
much more weakly than refute-or-accept. They continue: 
 
If you not want to concede something, just challenge it. That would only mean that you are 
prepared to hear your opponent’s reasons. (137) 
 
Still, their norm generates a default that places the burden of non-acceptance on the 
interlocutor, not the arguer (proponent). The proponent only has to say ‘I challenge’, 
however. But if the challenge requires no reasons, just a blank utterance, it does not fit 
with the challenge structure of ordinary conversation. By imposing a burden on the 
challenger (to show that his challenge is not e.g. a mere sceptical one), a regress of 
justification or reason-demanding is blocked. Without the burden for a reason, the 
interlocutor has a free ride to challenge all claims of the proponent, including standardly 
conceded factual claims, and it dissolves the reciprocal obligations of the interlocutor to 
the arguer. 
 The imposition of these rules or norms is remarkable, whether in the stronger or 
weaker forms,  because these authors, I assume, aspire to have their models represent the 
structure of real dialogues or argument exchanges. The endpoint is acceptance as belief, 
not only an action or a move in a game, which requires a prior commitment to participate 
and (try to) win. Excluding certain ways of acting is a far cry conceptually from 
excluding, or trying to exclude, certain options for believing that is crucial for generating 
the intellectual pressure implied by my hypothesis. 
 Social norms of civility, courtesy, and the like exclude one’s unresponsive 
reaction to the overtures of another, regardless of what one thinks. If someone invites you 
to a dinner, you are obliged to return the call. You ought to respond positively or decline 
(with apologies), eliminating the option of not responding or delaying a response (without 
special reason).  
 We are acclimated to such norms. We hardly notice them, yet they powerfully 
constrain our available responses. These norms offer the benefit of removing a burden of 
deliberation and decision by dictating the by-and-large correct social response. These 
norms, recall, arise with little or no conscious decision or teaching, as, presumably, 
solutions to manifest coordination problems.  
 These norms fall under the very broad category of default norms or default 
reasoning. Default reasoning moves a process forward, unless there is intervention, rather 
than requiring a command. This is extremely economical and so helpful—when you do 
not tell your computer where to save a file, it default–automatically–saves it to the drive 
you are working on. It eliminates—excludes—the possibility of not saving it at all, unless 
you intervene and decide. Gricean conversational reasoning works via defaults. If you 
assert a weak statement like ‘some students came to the party’, when you are mutually 
believe to be in a position to know how many came, then by default, you implicate that 
‘not all the students came to the party’. Excluded-middle norms as defaults dictate that 
when you do not object to an assertion, you are default represented as accepting it. 
Thereby the possibility of no response or suspension of judgment by you is burdened 
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3.  
 
These excluded-middle norms exclude what is not logically excludable. The law of 
excluded middle (LEM) is that for any proposition p, either p is true or not-p is true. The 
negation is a full or external negation, generating a contradictory, not a contrary. Either 
John is rich or John is poor is not an instance of LEM. It leaves open the ‘middle’ that 
John is neither rich nor poor.  
 Once one introduces an operator, like a modal, on a proposition, there is no longer 
an instance of LEM. An instance of LEM for belief is: 
 
for every proposition p, either X believes that p or X does not believe that p. 
 
But it is not an instance of LEM that  
 
for every proposition p, either X believes that p or X believes that not-p. (Adler 
2000) 
 
Yet, treating the latter as an instance of the former is a common fallacy.  
 What an excluded-middle norm excludes divides into two. The more familiar 
middle is ‘suspension of judgment’, which is to claim that the evidence or reasons do not 
favor a definite position. When one’s evaluation ends in a suspension of judgment, one is 
in a position to hold a favorable degree of belief in accord with the balance of the 
evidence. 
 The one who suspends judgment has a weaker burden than one who comes to a 
definite pro or con conclusion. The suspender only has to show that the evidence is 
indecisive, for which it is enough that further investigation and open questions remain. 
He grants himself latitude to achieve greater certainty, which is available for most any 
serious or complex or controversial position. Our agnostic can draw upon the criticisms 
that each definite pro/or con position enters of the other.  Still, though suspending 
judgment, he participates to the extent of putting forth some claim for which a 
justification can be demanded. 
 The alternative to suspension of judgment that is still within the ‘middle’ is 
simply indifference; entering no claim at all. Just as we hold no beliefs on a vast number 
of propositions, so too are we are indifferent to a vast number. Logically or conceptually, 
silence could be just that: non-agreement or non-interest in response to the option, not a 
denial. Suspension of judgment is often warranted on purely evidential grounds. 
Indifference needs no warrant or grounds, beyond, perhaps, the standing conditions of our 




Given that excluded-middles are never logically excludable and that excluded-middle 
norms place a heavy burden on participants by restricting their options, why accept that 
they are epistemically normative? Wouldn’t such norms fail to be rational to endorse, 
even if we unfortunately come to believe in them? With norms of civility, a need for 
coordination, shared expectations, and social harmony motivates their adoption. But 
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acceptance of an argument as cogent issues in belief in the conclusion. How could it be 
rational to adopt a norm which excludes an option that can fit the circumstances, more 
specifically, the evidence? Why do we even need excluded-middle epistemic norms, over 
and above civility norms to govern our social interaction in argumentation and the like? 
Our interest in truth and our correlative responsiveness to reasons is sufficient to move us 
to a decisive judgment, as the evidence or argument allows. 
 A line of argument, already hinted at, favoring excluded-middle norms as 
epistemic starts off from an insight found in James’ (1951) failed argument for the ‘will 
to believe’. (Adler 2002 Ch. 4.)  Although James explicitly attempted to distance his ‘will 
to believe’ argument from Pascal and his wager, he takes over a key premise : ‘Yes; but 
you must wager’ (Pascal 2005 p. 212) The form it takes for James is that the choice to 
believe or not is, effectively, a forced option. 
 But James recognized that the choice of belief or disbelief is not logically an 
instance of LEM. His claim is that in matters essentially not settled by evidence, which 
are of importance to one’s life, the option of no decision is not practically different from 
deciding-not, and so one is in a forced choice to accept faith or reject it (at will). 
Agnosticism is assimilated to atheism because in the former case one still does not 
partake of those religious activities requiring faith, which is a necessary condition for 
discovering whether religious beliefs are true.  
 A broad set of cases that fit within James’ reasoning are of the need or essential 
value for argument, reasoning, and conversation of full beliefs, rather than degrees of 
belief (the agnostic’s suspension of judgment). These practices or patterns of thought 
cannot be engaged, or they would be overburdened, without many beliefs that are full or 
all-or-nothing beliefs. You are typically inspired to engage with someone who claims that 
the US should impose a military draft, not someone who believes it is only probable or 
improbable, which is not to take a stance. (The argument suggested here is developed in 
my 2002 Ch.9; and 2006.) 
 The rationale for excluding a middle of suspension of judgment is more forceful 
for excluding indifference. Epistemic practices like argumentation cannot work if 
indifference is always a free, open middle. The possibility, not even the actuality, of 
indifference as a live option threatens epistemic practices like argument and their 
coordinative expectation of uptake and correlative response. Excluded middle norms 
enforce participation, including the epistemically valuable demand for explicitization of 
one’s reasons. 
 Consider, by contrast, settings in which such a ‘middle’ is wide open. You 
examine some shirts in a department store, and just walk away. If a salesperson asks you 
‘can I help?’ any number of casual responses are available; most usually, I assume,  ‘No, 
just looking.’ There is slight or no discomfort. You do not even have to explain to the 
salesperson why. It would be offensive or off-putting for the salesperson to request your 
reason for not purchasing anything. Of course, salespersons are often so willing to offend 
and discomfort. They will succeed if the buyer (mistakenly, but understandably) believes 
that he should have a reason or justification for not purchasing the product. However, 
there is no norm here, beyond that of civility and courtesy, which is now abused. No 
demand for reasons or justification is appropriate.  
 If refute-or-accept governs, a hearer or interlocutor is bound to participate since 
his lack of refutation amounts to a representation of himself as accepting. If, when 
6 
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presented with an argument, one can simply respond ‘Thanks, I’ll think about it’, the 
exchange is aborted, which is particularly unsatisfactory  for the arguer. He has offered 
grounds that purport to establish a conclusion, and he has taken it that the hearer or 
interlocutor will respond accordingly, as the interlocutor represented himself both as 
competent to judge and as a participant. In assuming that the interlocutor is not holding 
up his reciprocal duties to reach a verdict of either acceptance or a reasoned refutation, 





We are now positioned to converge on the specifics of my hypothesis. Excluded middle 
norms govern reason-giving/reason-requesting settings and what they exclude is 
sometimes a position one  should (or must) take. Excluded-middle norms impose an 
enormous burden on the hearer and renders him vulnerable to false persuasion as 
suggested by Locke’s objection to the ad ignorantium: “It proves not another man to be 
in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better.” 
(Locke 1975  Book IV  Ch. XVII section 20) 
 Locke’s objection requires qualification on the scope or reach or domain of 
excluded-middle norms (as believed or as normative), but not wholesale rejection. If so, 
then a hearer or interlocutor regularly faces a conflict when he cannot live up to the 
demands that he endorses for reasons, justification, refutation or articulate defense, and 
yet one cannot simply accept the arguer’s conclusion. Acceptance as belief cannot, in any 
case, strictly obey excluded-middle norms, as shown by your (inarticulate) resistance to 
e.g., a well versed Kennedy conspiracy theory presented to you. 
 For a more developed and moderate example, imagine that you meet someone 
who presents you with a powerful argument against a longstanding position that you are 
strongly committed to, but for which you have not thought about for a while e.g. that 
capital punishment is a permissible punishment. His argument seems a good one, and, 
though you have reasons for dissent here and there on small points, you recognize that 
you cannot come close to refuting the argument. Now I think at this juncture you will feel 
strong discomfort, as well as normative and social pressure: the arguer presses you that if 
you cannot refute his argument, you should accept it. This is the intellectual pressure and 
first-personal conflict that I take to be a missing ingredient in understanding the 
prevalence of distortion, with confabulation as an illustration.  
 In the absence of an excluded middle norm the intellectual pressure would greatly 
diminish, especially when one holds a contrary or opposed position. The explanations for 
distortion canvassed above would lose their grip. Why the effort to distort or to self-
deceive, if one can just be respectfully indifferent, as you are in the department store? 
The further, complimentary, conjecture is that given the pressure, distortion is  motivated 
as a way to remove intellectual discomfort, if one cannot meet the pressure rationally by 
straightforward refutation or articulation of cogent reasons. 
 Compare this pressure to our susceptibility to the car salesman’s pressure to 
accept or to explain why you reject a ‘deal’ he offers. You judge the deal to be the best 
for the car you are interested in. However, you did not intend to buy now, though you did 
‘your homework’. The pressure to buy is accompanied by puzzlement, since you sense 
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something is wrong, given your knowledge of the salesman’s motives and how much 
better skilled he is at selling than you are at buying. Yet there does not seem to be an 
opening to enter these as reasons pro or con buying the car (i.e. excluding the middle of 
simply not-buying). The deal is right before you. You represent yourself as competent to 
judge it, as he treats you by his presentation and his willingness to answer your questions. 
The final decision is yours. So there will be internal-intellectual pressure, even if you do 
not then agree to the deal. Your acquiescence or endorsement of the excluded-middle 
norm to buy-or-to-explain-why-not presses you to articulate a justification for your non-
acceptance. Your grounds for resistance to the ‘deal’ may not be accessible to you or they 
may fall flat in the circumstances (‘I have a policy of never agreeing to a deal on the 
spot’)  
 The bind generates pressure that seeks relief in distortion, and it is at this juncture 
that the hypothesis engages with the psychological accounts. The psychological 
generalization that is the model for resolving the pressure by credulity (or credulous 
dissent) derives from cognitive dissonance and related research: 
 
If a significant rule or norm or practice, which one endorses, enjoins A (an 
excluded middle norm like refute or accept), and  believing that p would lead one 
to recognize (admit)  that one’s act had freely violated A (neither refuted nor 
accepted), and there is a call to justify one’s act, then there is an internal  
discomfort  (“dissonance arousal”) that generates internal pressure (“dissonance 
motivation”) to a contrary belief  (e.g., that one had actually refuted; that the 
argument is cogent), and thereby not to believe that p, if this can be accomplished 
easily, outside of self-awareness.5
 
Excluded-middle norms – refute-or-accept; believe or disbelieve (all or nothing); provide 
sufficient reasons for one’s judgment or admit one’s failure of normal self-knowledge – 
demand a difficult achievement, as a condition on non-acceptance. An interlocutor might 
not be able to meet that demand, which, given the perceived violation of the applicable 
norm, generates cognitive dissonance under the above generalization. 
 The dissonance is especially pressing with excluded middle norms because these 
norms force one to a judgment, which would often be premature if one clearly had the 
option of no choice. Commitment to a decision is the greater if the decision (judgment) is 
viewed as freely made. Excluded middle norms in operation do–more strongly, can – not 
appear to be imposing forced choices. We retain an illusion of complete freedom, as a 
consequence of how we must represent ourselves  (as judging freely). 
 In the case of the car salesman, when you reject his offer, you walk out 
discomforted, which discomfort you can relieve by coming to think the deal was worse 
than you then judged. Or, if you do accept his offer, to relieve the pressure, you (non-
consciously) seek ways to view the deal as even better e.g. you focus only on ads for the 
                                                 
5 As far as I know there is no formulation of dissonance theory as a generalization, so the proposal here is 
speculative and certainly at best a rough approximation.. The complexities of the issue is evident in a 
Cooper and Fazio’s 1984 review essay. On the role of no-choice options or forced choice (and the illusion 
of freedom) in a cognitive dissonance framework studies for consumer choices see Festinger (1964)  
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car.6 (Contrast your position with a ‘shopper’ who is near-by, and overhears the offer, but 
who is not directly involved with the salesman, and thus feels little of your pressure. Yet, 
the deal is the same for each. The hypothesis predicts that the overhearer is far less likely 
to confabulate or distort.) 
 The alternatives to the opposed distortions of dismissive underestimation or 
credulous overestimation is to tolerate intellectual discomfort or dissonance with one’s 
lack of a fully satisfactory answer to oneself or to one’s interlocutor for one’s resistance 
to belief. 
 The intellectual pressure that results from a failure to follow an excluded-middle 
norm, like refute-or-accept, when one judges it applicable and yet that one cannot live up 
to it can be unpacked further. First, there is a normative pressure toward believing the 
arguer (e.g., the car salesman), despite belief resistance. In some way, you think the 
salesman is imposing a rightful demand. Second, if you discover that you were falsely 
persuaded, you blame yourself (that you were complicitous, rather than erring innocently 
or helplessly). Obviously, in the case of the car salesman, you agreed to the deal, and you 
had opportunity to investigate and to ask questions, even if under time constraints. Third, 
and perplexing in light of the second characteristic, you also take yourself to have done 
no wrong (or less wrong than that for which you blame yourself). You were not able to 
find a flaw in his deal, so you are duty-bound to accept it. For the rules or norms of 
argumentation, as well as the practice itself, are non-optional in our social and epistemic 
lives. The credulity at stake is of false persuasion rather than lies (or illusions) because 
with lies (or illusions) one is helpless, but here one has been presented with the relevant 
reasons (the ‘deal’) and the opportunity to ask questions. 
 These three features are those of a distinctive credulity. Because the credulity is 
broad in scope and ineliminable, as normative over central practices, it exhibits key 
features that we want for an explanation of the persistence and extent of distortion. It 
seems to hook on to a weakness we suffer, even if we can learn to mitigate or to 
overcome it The persistence would otherwise be surprising given that we do not want to 
be credulous. The bind arises from the seemingly innocent act of participation in an 
exchange. The exchange appears to leave it wide open how one responds, partly a 
reflection on how the hearer or interlocutor represents himself, as responding free of any 
constraints such as those of excluded-middle norms. But his actual normative 
circumstances constrain him from the vast middle options. Since there is  no recognition, 
while participating, in the role of these norms, the distortion cannot appear as such to the 
distorter. Thus the pressure toward distortion is compatible with the distorter maintaining 







                                                 
6 In choice situations, consumers determine their selections by anticipatory regret, since some alternatives 
have to be foregone. Since there is more to regret in opting for an opposed position that fails, rather than 
sticking to one’s own, the resolution would favor the argument closest to one’s antecedent view. 
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